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A its December, 1981 Plenary Session, the
Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS) rejected by a close vote a Pro-
posed Recommendation from its Committee
on Agency Decisional Processes entitled "Sep-
aration of Functions and Staff Communica-
tions with Decisionmakers in Agency Proceed-
ings," thereby abandoning a project that had
been several years in gestation. That action
was contrary to the hopes of the Section of
ANTONIN SCALIA Administrative Law, which had endorsed the
general approach of the Draft Recommendation at its Summer, 1981
Council Meeting.' Since the proposal in its final form does not appear
in any published source,' I am using these pages to record it, with the
hope that it may prove useful to those who must grapple with separa-
tion-of-functions problems in the future-particularly agency lawyers
who must make the difficult separation decisions. In addition, I want to
unburden myself of a few thoughts concerning the significance of the
Conference rejection.
The statutory provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
governing separation of functions have the great virtue of concise-
ness-and the corresponding vice of uncertain application. Section
554(d) provides that an employee "engaged in the performance of
investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in any case may
not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the
'The Draft Recommendation presented to the Section Council was not identical to that
later presented to the ACUS Assembly; several relatively minor changes were made at
the instance of the ACUS Council. Nor was the proposal presented to the Section Council
identical to the last published ACUS Committee Draft, which appeared at 46 Fed. Reg.
26487 (May 13, 1981), a few subsequent changes having been made by the Committee.2Earlier proposals were published for public comment at 45 Fed. Reg. 68949 (Oct. 17,
1980) and 46 Fed. Reg. 26487 (May 13, 1981).
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decision, recommended decision, or agency review . . . except as
witness or counsel in public proceedings."' Two obvious deficiencies of
the provision are apparent: (1) It applies only to formal adjudication'
(i.e., adjudication conducted pursuant to the procedures set forth in
sections 556-57 of the APA)-and not even to all formal adjudication,
since initial licensing and adjudication involving rates, facilities or
practices of public utilities and carriers are specifically exempted.5 (2) It
applies only to adjudication that is required to be formal by the terms of
the statute itself-so that if an agency should voluntarily apply sections
556-57 procedures where they are not technically required, the
separation-of-functions requirement would not automatically be in-
voked. The Proposed Recommendation addressed these problems by
specifying that the principle of separation of functions should be
applied "in any proceeding set by an agency for disposition as a formal
proceeding, whether or not it is governed by section 554(d) of the
Administrative Procedure Act." Thus, the separation requirement
would apply to formal rulemaking and formal initial licensing as well as
to other formal adjudication;' and it would apply to all proceedings
which the agency directs to be conducted pursuant to sections 556-57,
whether or not compliance with those provisions is statutorily
required.7
So much of the proposal was uncontroversial. Most of the other
problems it addresses are more difficult. Essentially they relate to the
meaning that should be given the key statutory terms:
* "engaged in performance." This obviously includes personal per-
formance. But does it include actual supervision of one who per-
forms? Supervisory authority over one who performs, without actual
supervision? Subordinate relationship to one who performs?
• "of investigative or prosecutingfunctions." Does this include partic-
ipation by a commission staff member in the decision whether to
designate a matter for hearing? Response by a technical expert to a
question posed by the prosecuting staff? Testimony by a technical
35 U.S.C. § 554(d). For obvious reasons of necessity, agency heads are explicitly
exempted from the prohibition. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(C).
4See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a).
55 U.S.C. § 554(d)(A) & (B).
6This reaffirms an earlier ACUS recommendation. Resolution No. 3, 1 C.F.R. § 310.2
(1973).7The agency would remain free, however, to use formal procedures without specific
reference to §§ 556-57, thereby avoiding any separation-of-functions requirement. See
Note 3 of the Proposed Recommendation. It was thought necessary to leave this option
available lest the mandatory imposition of separation requirements in cases where they
would not be feasible deter voluntary adoption of desirable formal procedures.
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expert? Briefing and argument by the agency's general counsel in
connection with judicial review of a factually related case?
* "may not... participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision,
or agency review." Does this include staff consultation with the agency
heads regarding the decision whether to launch an investigation?
Issue a complaint? Designate a matter for hearing? Add new parties
to a pending case? Reopen a closed case? Specify issues for adjudica-
tive resolution? Terminate, narrow or expand a pending case? Re-
solve procedural issues?
The great virtue of the Proposed Recommendation is that it
approaches these questions with the circumspection and flexibility they
require. It sets forth the general principle that an "adversary" is subject
to the separation-of-functions prohibitions ( B(1)(a)); but its only
categorical designation of who does or does not constitute an "adver-
sary" is the specification that the term includes "a staff member who at
any time participates personally as an investigator or in planning,
developing or presenting evidence," and does not include "one who as
presiding officer or assistant to the presiding officer helps to develop
the record in a proceeding" ( B(1)(b)). Beyond that, the definition of
"adversary" and the specification of disqualified staff members are not
hard and fast, but must vary according to "the nature of the proceed-
ing and the issues in dispute as well as the nature and the degree of
participation by the staff members in question" ( B(1)(c)).' For as the
committee report points out, the nature of the proceeding and the
nature of the staff member's participation vitally affect not only the
appearance of fairness but also the formation of that "will to win"
which is the touchstone of adversariness. This is the crux of the pro-
posal: a rejection of the notion that a unitary description of disqualified
personnel can be applied across the board to the multitude of formal
agency proceedings-from civil penalty hearings to ratemaking, from
license revocation to formal rulemaking-and without regard to the
varying degrees of staff participation.
Paragraph B(2) elaborates upon this flexible approach, specifying
those activities that "ordinarily" should not be disqualifying. And para-
'The earlier version of paragraph B(l)(c) had specified that the remaining subpara-
graphs of paragraph B were meant as guidelines in giving further content to the word
"adversary." See 46 Fed. Reg. 26487 (May 13, 1981). This was changed at the instance of
the ACUS Council to its present form, which recites that the succeeding subparagraphs
are guidelines with regard to disqualification for "less direct participation or
association"--presumably less direct than that described in the limited definition of
"adversary" in paragraph B( 1 )(b). Personally, I prefer the earlier version, which was that
presented to the Section Council.
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graphs B(3) and B(4) make a distinction between "non-accusatory
cases" and "accusatory cases or other like proceedings which involve
the imposition of sanctions or allegations of conduct bearing on a
party's fitness to acquire or retain a valuable privilege." As to the
former, the proposal sets forth activities that "ordinarily" should not be
disqualifying; as to the latter, it describes staff members who "ordinar-
ily should be disqualified." Mere supervisory relationship to an adver-
sary, for example, ordinarily would disqualify in an accusatory case but
not in a non-accusatory proceeding.'
Beyond highlighting this essential element of flexibility, I will let the
Proposed Recommendation speak for itself. I will indulge in a few
musings, however, concerning the significance of the Conference's
action on this item-and concerning the perplexing disagreement
between the Conference and the Section of Administrative Law.
The reader will note that the portions of the Proposed Recom-
mendation that have the most "bite"-subparagraphs 2 through 5 of
paragraph B-apply only "to advice from staff members to agency
heads, and do not apply to contacts between staff members and other
agency decisionmakers." To those unfamiliar with the history of the
proposal, this limitation may seem to be merely the acknowledgment of
yet another important variable. The ACUS committee evidently
thought that administrative law judges (ALJs) require a somewhat
higher degree of insulation-or, to put the point the other way round,
that the doctrine of necessity justifies more liberal rules for contact with
agency heads-so that the specification of permissible and impermissi-
ble contacts at lower levels within the agency was left for another day.
Unfortunately, that would be an inaccurate speculation. The fact is
that the committee proposal originally extended to all agency
decisionmakers.'0 The limitation to agency heads was adopted only
after the inclusion of ALJs provoked vigorous and overwhelming
opposition at the Conference's December, 1980 Plenary Session, re-
sulting in recommital of the committee proposal. And that successful
operation (judging from the floor debate) rested not upon the need for
subtle refinement and differentiation but upon antagonism towards all
off-the-record consultation between lower-level decisionmakers (ALJs
in particular) and agency staff.
9
'he major reason the Section of Administrative Law endorsed only the basic thrust of
the Proposed Recommendation, and not the precise text, was disagreement over the
adequacy of the terminology "accusatory" and "non-accusatory" to delineate the catego-
ries of proceedings that require fundamentally different treatment.
"See 45 Fed. Reg. 68949 (Oct. 17, 1980).
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This is, I think, a noteworthy phenomenon, demonstrating how far
the consensus has changed in recent years regarding the institutional
nature of the ALJ's decision. It represents the continuation and
perhaps the completion of trend observed (and opposed) by the origi-
nal Administrative Conference in 1962:
The complex nature of many rate proceedings makes it necessary for an
initial decision to reflect understanding of accounting procedures, engineer-
ing terms, and statistical data. Even if a hearing examiner is able over a
period of years to acquire expertness in these varied disciplines, the days
required to perform detailed analysis of exhibits or elaborate computations
is often an ill-use of such an examiner's time. If the examiner lacks these
skills, depriving him of any opportunity to consult on an informal basis with
someone who has them results in an initial decision which is less informed
and useful that it might be. Instead of reflecting the examiner's independent
judgment, it reflects his ignorance. Use of specialists to aid in analyzing the
record, to serve as a sounding board for ideas of the hearing examiner, to
prepare schedules or data in support of conclusions already reached, or the
like, is not an invasion of the examiner's prerogative or a departure from the
parties' desire to have an initial decision reflecting the examiner's indepen-
dent judgment.
We emphasize the need for assistance and consultation because an atti-
tude has grown up in recent years of considering anything other than
complete isolation of the hearing examiner as somehow improper. The
exaggerated concern with ex parte communications engendered by a few
flagrant instances of wrongdoing and by repeated discussion has created a
climate in which many examiners are hesitant to talk over the problems they
are wrestling with in their cases even with one another. Practices which are
everyday occurrences with many of our ablest judges (e.g., researching a
point in the library to supply facts and argument relating to a policy choice;
utilizing a disinterested person for an abstract discussion of ideas relpting to
a question of law presented in a case; using a law clerk or other subordinate
as a sounding board for ideas or as eyes-and-ears in carrying out detailed
research; etc.) are avoided not because the hearing examiner feels he would
not benefit by them but solely because they might expose him to foolish or
unreasonable criticism. The intelligent and informed participation of a
hearing examiner cannot be produced by cutting him off from his prior
experience, his daily contacts, the insights sometimes available in the library,
or the opportunity to exchange views with disinterested persons. The pre-
vailing climate which induces hearing examiners to operate in an intellectual
vacuum can and must be changed."
The view criticized in that excerpt now apparently holds sway-or at
least cannot be effectively opposed-within the Conference itself, a
body in which agency officials hold a 60% voting majority.
"Report of the Committee on Rulemaking to the [Temporary] Administrative Con-
ference, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 104-05 (1962).
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The other point of interest is the disagreement between the Confer-
ence and the Section of Administrative Law regarding the desirability
of the final proposal. To the extent that any proposal for sound
administration may be said to favor one side rather than the other, this
one would appear to be a net benefit to the agencies rather than private
practitioners. To be sure, it does not permit intra-agency contacts that
the law now forbids, and perhaps even excludes some intra-agency
contacts that are not strictly forbidden. But its major purpose and
effect is simply to eliminate uncertainty; and, as the ACUS consultant's
report suggests, the victims of that uncertainty are primarily the agen-
cies-which, to avoid possible impairment of lengthy proceedings,
apply prophylactic restrictions upon intra-agency contacts.
How, then, to explain the fact that our Section of Administrative
Law, composed predominately of private practitioners, approved the
basic thrust of the proposal, while the Administrative Conference,
where agency officials are in the majority, rejected it? That result
certainly does credit to the disinterestedness of both bodies - unless (as
Voltaire once said when asked why it was he always spoke flatteringly of
a certain fellow who had nothing but criticism for him) we may both
have been mistaken. As Chairman of the Section I must assume, ex
officio, that the Section was both disinterested and correct, and that the
fault must lie with the Conference. Perhaps the new Reagan adminis-
tration officials in the Conference, fresh from the private sector,
underestimated the strain which prophylactic separation places upon
agency resources. Or perhaps they overestimated the degree to which
the proposal would impose constraints not strictly required by law. Or
perhapsthey and the private-sector members of the Conference alike
simply preferred the known devil of uncertainty to the unknown devil
of the Proposed Recommendation. Or perhaps one should abandon all
attempt at detailed analysis and rest content with Dr. Johnson's pithy
explanation of an error in his Dictionary."2
In any case, the ill fated ACUS proposal is set forth below. Those
who desire a more intensive exploration of the problems to which it is
addressed, and a description of the case law it reflects, should read the
excellent study prepared by the committee's consultant, Prof. Michael
Asimow, which appears in 81 Col. L. Rev. 759 (1981).
""Ignorance, madam, pure ignorance."
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PROPOSED RECOMMENDATION
SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS AND STAFF
COMMUNICATIONS WITH DECISIONMAKERS IN
AGENCY PROCEEDINGS
Preamble
Separation of functions is a principle of administrative law which seeks to
protect the independence and the objectivity of the adjudicative function by
restricting its combination with inconsistent functions, such as prosecution,
investigation, or advocacy.
This principle is implemented in the Administrative Procedure Act by
section 554(d), which precludes agency prosecutors or investigators in a case
from participating in the decision in that case, either as decisionmaker or as
off-the-record adviser.' Although section 554(d) is applicable only to certain
formal adjudications, agencies observe its principles in virtually all proceedings
where the record is developed through formal hearing procedures.
In formal proceedings, separation of functions serves to insulate decision-
makers from off-the-record communications from agency staff members
whose personal involvement in the proceeding is likely to impair their ability to
give objective advice. This insulation of the decisionmaker also serves to
enhance the parties' confidence in the impartiality of the decisionmaker and in
the overall fairness of the proceeding. However, separation of functions is not
free of costs. It precludes agency decisionmakers from obtaining advice from
the best qualified staff adviser if that expert is considered to have been involved
as an adversary in the proceeding, and it can interfere with the ability of agency
heads to set the general policy of the agency and to become aware of emerging
problems. It also has the potential to cause serious delays, costly duplication of
staff, and confusion about whit communications are permissible, and to inter-
fere with other collateral agency functions.
The principle of separation of functions need not be applied on an all-or-
nothing basis in formal proceedings. Distinctions can be drawn between the
different roles of staff members and the types and stages of proceedings for the
purpose of establishing a framework for decision which provides basic fairness
to the participants without imposing unnecessary costs on the regulatory
process. This recommendation provides guidance as to the kinds of activities
which should be deemed inconsistent with later participation in the decision-
making process and as to the kinds of contacts between agency decisionmakers
and staff adversaries which should be permissible under agency practice.
'Section 554(d) also requires that officers who preside over adjudications subject to
that section not be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of the
prosecuting or investigative staff of the agency. Analytically this requirement is also an
implementation of the principle of separation of functions. However, we are not aware
of any dissatisfaction with the present institutional arrangements for carrying out this
requirement, and it is beyond the scope of this recommendation.
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In informal rulemaking proceedings different considerations apply. In such
proceedings the purpose of requiring public notice and opportunity to com-
ment is to guarantee to the public at large an opportunity to submit views for
agency consideration. The agency has an affirmative obligation to consider all
relevant matter presented in the proceeding. This obligation can be especially
weighty when the proposed rule has occasioned widespread interest since this
usually results in a large record, with complex facts and policy issues and many
affected participants. In this context the value of according to each participant
the procedural protections common to formal proceedings is outweighed by
the nature of the proceeding and the agency's need to avail itself fully of staff
expertise. The Conference therefore recommends that agencies ordinarily not
employ separation of functions in informal rulemaking proceedings.
However, the opportunity for the public to comment in informal rulemak-
ing requires that information considered to be significant by the agency in the
proceeding be made public, including information introduced by staff.'
Recommendation
A. The principle of separation of functions should be applied in any pro-
ceeding set by an agency for disposition as a formal proceeding' whether or not
it is governed by section 554(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
B. The following principles should govern the application of separation of
functions in proceedings covered by paragraph A:
1. A staff member who is an "adversary" in such a proceeding should not
participate or advise in the decision, except through an on-the-record pre-
sentation.
a) An "adversary" in a proceeding for purposes of separation of func-
tions is a staff member whose role in that proceeding or a factually
related proceeding is likely to cause him to identify with or against
the interest of one of the parties.
b) The term "adversary" includes a staff member who at any time
participates personally as an investigator or in planning, developing
or presenting evidence in that proceeding or a factually related
proceeding (but not one who as presiding officer or assistant to the
presiding officer helps to develop the record in a proceeding).
'See ACUS Recommendations 76-3, 77-3.
'The Administrative Conference has recommended that the APA be amended to
extend the principles of section 554(d) to all formal proceedings. Resolution No. 3, 1
C.F.R. Section 310.2 (1973). The Conference believes the guidelines set forth in this
Recommendation to be consistent with the requirements of the APA. The term "formal
proceeding," as used in this recommendation, means any proceeding governed by
sections 556 and 557 of the APA, as well as any proceeding, either rulemaking or
adjudication, which the agency, by regulation or order, requires to be conducted in
conformity with those sections, This recommendation does not address the question of
the desirability of formal proceedings for any particular category of agency determina-
tion. For example, see ACUS Recommendation 72-5.
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c) Agencies may also disqualify staff members because of less direct
participation or association in the matter under consideration but,
in deciding whether to disqualify such staff members, agencies
should consider the nature of the proceeding and the issues in
dispute as well as the nature and the degree of participation by the
staff members in question.
The guidelines in the following paragraphs are intended to assist
agencies in applying paragraph B(1)(c) to advice from staff mem-
bers to agency heads, and do not apply to contacts between staff
members and other agency decisionmakers.
2. A staff member ordinarily should not be disqualified from advising
agency heads solely by reason of: (a) assisting the agency in deciding whether
to investigate a matter, start a proceeding, or set a case for formal hearing, or
in framing the issue to be considered at the hearing; or (b) assisting the
agency in preparing for or conducting collateral matters such as informal
public meetings, budget planning, informal rulemaking, or Congressional
testimony.
3. In non-accusatory cases, including those rulemaking, ratemaking,
licensing, and other like proceedings which do not involve the imposition of
sanctions or allegations of conduct bearing on a party's fitness to acquire or
retain a valuable privilege, a staff member ordinarily should not be disqual-
ified from advising agency heads solely by reason of:
a) organizational relationship, as a supervisor, colleague or subordi-
nate, of an adversary;
b) occasionally furnishing technical information or technical advice to
an adversary, and
c) participating on behalf of the agency in the same or a relatedjudicial
proceeding.
4. In accusatory cases or other like proceedings which involve the imposi-
tion of sanctions or allegations of conduct bearing on a party's fitness to
acquire or retain a valuable privilege, agencies should expand the category
of staff members who are disqualified from advising agency heads. In
particular, the following staff members ordinarily should be disqualified:
a) The subordinates and the immediate supervisors of those who are
considered adversaries by reason of their having actively engaged in
planning, developing or presenting the case;
b) a staff member who participates on behalf of the agency in a related
judicial proceeding involving the merits of the administrative pro-
ceeding, other than a proceeding to review agency action on the
basis of the administrative record;
c) a staff member who provides technical information or technical
advice to an adversary, and
d) a staff member who participates as a witness.
5. A staff member who is an adversary should be available to advise the
agency on predesignation matters (such as those mentioned in 2(a) and
collateral matters (such as those mentioned in 2(b)).
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C. Separation of functions should not prevent agency heads from inform-
ing themselves of problems related to agency management and policy which
arise in or affect particular proceedings.
D. An agency should not ordinarily apply separation of functions in rule-
making unless the proceeding is governed by sections 556 and 557 of the APA
or set by the agency for disposition as a formal proceeding.
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